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W 
hile, until a short time ago, the insurance
sector had not been a focus of attention
for institutions charged with guaranteeing
financial stability, a number of questions have
recently arisen. Indeed, the following issues have led
experts to consider the new role played by the
insurance sector in the major economic and financial
balances: the overreaction of insurance stocks during
the equity market slump, airline stoppages in the
wake of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade
Center, the discovery of the strategic role of
reinsurance in the sustainability of risk coverage, the
growing influence of financial conglomerates, the
transfer of credit risk from the banking sector to other
sectors such as the insurance and reinsurance sectors,
and the temporary or long-term doubts about certain
types of coverage. Against this backdrop, it is natural
to reflect on the potential risks posed by the insurance
sector to national and international financial stability.
In Part One, we will assess the extent to which the
insurance sector may be a source of systemic risk.
In Part Two, we will examine in greater detail a
number of recent phenomena that have affected the
insurance sector and that may constitute new
sources of financial risk. In Part Three, we will
consider the State’s role in the stability or instability
of the insurance sector.
The major shocks that hit the insurance sector have raised questions as to the role of this sector in
financial stability and as to whether it is a potential source of systemic risk. The complexity of financial
conglomerates, risk transfers and reinsurance have intensified these preoccupations. From an in-depth
analysis of both its characteristics and empirical data on possible contagion from this sector, we can
conclude that the insurance sector does not appear to be a source of systemic risk for the economy.
Nevertheless, it may be a source of destabilising shocks for both the financial sector and the economy as
a whole. The emergence of financial conglomerates, the transfer of a significant share of credit risk to the
insurance sector and the particular role taken on by the reinsurance sector do not alter this conclusion. Its
potential to destabilise the financial system clearly justifies the regulation of this sector and, in particular,
the monitoring of the solvency of insurance companies. Nonetheless, the insurance sector’s long- to very
long-term horizon not only calls for specific rules but also rules that are sufficiently flexible to adapt to
changing circumstances. Such regulation would allow the insurance sector to fulfil its expected role as a
shock absorber.74 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 5 • November 2004
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1 See de Bandt and Hartmann (2000).
2 As W. Bagehot (1873) wrote: “Every banker knows that if he has to prove that he is worthy of credit, however good may be his argument,
in fact his credit has gone”.
1| INSURANCE, SYSTEMIC RISK
AND FINANCIAL STABILITY
From the financial stability perspective, it is
important to evaluate the extent to which the
insurance sector, like the banking sector, represents
a potential source of systemic risk, and the likelihood
of it triggering a liquidity crisis. In the banking
system, systemic risk refers to a default that, initially
confined to a few institutions, then spreads to the
whole financial sector, irrespective of the solvency
of the institutions concerned and, finally, may lead
to the collapse of payment systems or a general
economic crisis.1 The shockwave propagates through
interbank lending and banks’ lending to companies,
without which the financing of the economy and,
by extension economic activity, would be
interrupted. Systemic risk should not be confused
with a general shock affecting all banks
simultaneously and jeopardising their solvency,
e.g. an interest rate shock, an inflationary shock or
a stock market shock. The contagion involved in
systemic risk may to a great extent be psychological,
given that agents, in a world of imperfect
information, simply interpret the failure of the first
banks as a threat to other banks, which results in a
loss of confidence in them. The extent of contagion
cannot be predicted and may become self-fulfilling.2
While the initial default may merely be a “solvency
crisis”, the propagation of the crisis through
contagion becomes a “liquidity crisis”, as agents lose
all confidence in the system.
On examination, the insurance sector does not
appear to be a source of systemic risk. This does
not mean that it has not been subject to crises, or
that insurance companies are immune to
macroeconomic shocks. Neither does it mean that
contagion from this sector to other sectors, in
particular the banking sector, does not exist, as has
been observed in “extreme situations”. But insurance
contagion has never reached the same scale as bank
contagion and its transmission channels have not
been clearly identified, insofar as they tend to differ
from one crisis to the next.
1|1 Absence of systemic risk
in the insurance sector
There are no known cases of the bankruptcy of an
insurance or reinsurance company resulting in a
macroeconomic crisis. The only such case was in
Jamaica in 1996. However, this incident was due to
the fact that the insurance company in question
belonged to a banking conglomerate with a
monopoly on the local market rather than to a
systemic risk inherent to the insurance sector. We
can therefore assume that the economy is less
exposed to “systemic risk” from the insurance sector
than from the banking sector. There are four main
reasons for this.
• The production cycle in the insurance sector is opposite
to that of the banking sector. In the banking sector, loans
make deposits: the liquidity that banks inject into the
economy, in the form of loans, does not reflect past
wealth creation but only the expectation of future
wealth creation. However, in the insurance sector,
“deposits” can be said to make “loans”: the liquidity
that insurance companies inject into the economic
system simply transfers liquidities resulting from
wealth already created by the insured. Consequently,
at the macroeconomic level, the bankruptcy of an
insurer only consolidates a reallocation of capital and
wealth at the expense of the insured. This reallocation
was implicit but not perceived before the bankruptcy,
whereas the failure of a bank directly limits the
potential for future wealth creation.
• The liability turnover rate is lower in the insurance
sector than in the banking sector. The short-term
liquidity of bank deposits is vital because they are
used by agents in their everyday operation, whereas
that of insured parties’ claims on insurance
companies is only necessary for a subset of these
claims. In the non-life insurance sector, liquidity
requirements arise from claims that are,
theoretically, independent of the behaviour of the
insured. However, in the banking sector changes in
deposits always result from deliberate actions. In
the life insurance sector, amounts invested by clients
are just as stable as those deposited by customers of
banks, but for very different reasons: the stabilityBanque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 5 • November 2004 75
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3 See Berger (A.), Davies (S.) and Flannery (M.) (2000), and, Gunther (J.), Levonian (M.) and Moore (R.) (2001).
of bank deposits results from the fact that inflows
tend statistically to offset major outflows whereas
the stability of life insurance is simply contingent
on the weakness of outflows.
• Insurance claims are less liquid than bank deposits.
Depositors may withdraw funds from banks at any
time without notice, without being subject to a
financial penalty or taxation. In the case of insurance
investment, however, the possibilities of withdrawal
are more limited and more costly for the customer.
Withdrawal is almost impossible in the case of
non-life insurance. Early withdrawal is possible in
life insurance and bears certain similarities to the
withdrawal of bank deposits, but the scale and scope
are limited due to three following dissuasive
mechanisms: the penalties generally applicable in
favour of the insurer (in France, they may be as much
as 5% of the contract’s value); the loss of tax breaks
usually associated with this type of contract in Europe
(in France, withdrawal before the end of the
eight-year period results in a much higher taxation
of interests than the 7.5% flat rate applicable after
eight years); the time period for the actual recovery
of funds invested, which prevents immediate
withdrawals (in France, the insurer has two months
to repay the redeemable value of the contract).
• The network of interdependencies is much less dense
in the insurance sector than in the banking sector. Aside
from equity ties in the framework of groups and
financial conglomerates, which we will discuss
further on, the financial relationships between
insurance companies and other financial institutions
are much less dense than those of banking
organisations and mainly concern the reinsurance
and asset management sectors. In the insurance
sector, there are no similarities to the extremely
dense and shifting network of interbank lending that
is a source of fragility specific to credit institutions.
Stripping out savings-related premiums in order to
only take account of insurance risk premiums, the
share of premiums – and hence of risks – ceded by
insurers to other insurers or reinsurers only amount
to, at most, 13% of the total (see SwissRe, 2003).
Consequently, during the property slump at the end
of the 1980s and the start of the 1990s the insurance
sector, contrary to the banking sector, did not
hurriedly sell off its assets. During Japan’s crisis in
the 1990s, insurers were able to continue
contributing to the liquidity of the economy for ten
years before experiencing major difficulties, whereas
banks ran into serious difficulties at the start of the
crisis and weighed on the national economy
throughout the decade, despite the massive support
from monetary policy and fiscal stimuli.
1|2 Absorption, creation
and amplification of economic
shocks by the insurance sector
Financial stability is not limited to the question of
systemic risk. The insurance sector may also
contribute to financial stability or instability through
its capacity to absorb, create or amplify
macroeconomic shocks. Measuring this capacity is less
a theoretical question than an empirical one.
Unfortunately we do not possess the economic data
necessary to robustly test this capacity. The only data
that might allow us to carry out such tests, at least
partially, are stock market data. Without reiterating
efficient market theory, we can state that these data
contain much relevant and up-to-date information.
Consequently, we observe, for example, that these data
constitute fairly good leading indicators of US banks’
performance compared, in particular, with bank
supervisors’ assessments.3 Similarly, we might expect
that they offer good indications of the performance of
insurance companies. These data can probably not
however offer reliable information on bankruptcy risks
and systemic risks given that these risks have a bearing
on the limited liability of shareholders and the
intervention of guarantee funds that skew the market’s
assessment of companies’ net assets.
In this study we use stock market data to evaluate
the extent to which shocks occurring in the insurance
sector spread to the rest of the economy and,
conversely, how shocks in the rest of the economy
affect the insurance sector. This assessment is carried
out by comparing these results to those obtained in
the same conditions for the bank sector. In this way,
we can gain some insight into the scale of both the
contagion and absorption of shocks by the financial
sector. Such an exercise naturally vastly over
simplifies the reality and reduces contagion to past
relationships between variables.76 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 5 • November 2004
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For exploratory purposes, and without claiming to
exhaust the possibilities of econometric analysis, we
present below the results of an empirical study on
the interdependencies between the financial sector –
broken down into two sub-sectors (insurance and
banking) – and the macroeconomic environment,
represented here as the aggregate economy and
monetary policy. The insurance sector, the banking
sector and the aggregate economy are represented
by the stock market indices of the corresponding
sectors and of the market as a whole. Monetary
policy, which we used in the study due to its
independence, is represented by the three-month
interest rate. The data used are the daily
DJ EuroStoxx indices and three-month interest rates
of the euro area over the past fifteen years
(1989-2004). Data were obtained from the Ecowin
database. Note that the gap between the logarithm
of the index and its trend was used instead of
observed data. This transformation makes it possible
to strip out the trend, which is not being studied
here, from the measure of volatility. We thus obtain
series whose interdependence can be measured
using vector-autoregression (VAR) models, in which
each dependent variable is a function of past values
of itself and of other variables.
The residuals of these equations are then
decomposed into basic shocks that affect each of
the four variables and that are therefore specific to
them in that they are not the product of the
behaviour of the other variables. The shocks specific
to three-month interest rates are broadly determined
by monetary policy. The shocks specific to the stock
market index represent shocks common to the
economy as a whole, excluding monetary policy.
The shocks specific to stock market indices of the
banking and insurance sectors correspond to shocks
common to each of the two sectors, excluding
monetary policy shocks and shocks common to the
economy as a whole.
We then use the estimated equations and the
decomposition of their residuals to simulate the
consequences of the four shocks specific to the four
variables in question. We carried out two types of
simulation. The first reproduced the series for
1989-2004 to calculate the contribution of each of
the four shocks to the changes in the four variables
during the period. A fifth variable was added to
four variables presented below representing the
price of a number of major European insurance
companies (3) and banks (3) in order to estimate
the average impact of the specific shocks to these
companies taken individually. The second type of
simulation uses the Monte-Carlo method to make,
for each period, a random draw of shocks and
calculate, on this basis, the uncertainty margin for
the contribution of these shocks to the fluctuations
of the four variables, first for a short period of around
six months and then for a longer period of around
four years. We can thus test the impact of the most
extreme shock scenarios.
Table 1 sums up the findings of the first type of
simulation, i.e. historical simulations. It shows that
over the past fifteen years insurance companies have
absorbed more economic shocks than they have
produced, and that they differ in this respect from
banking institutions:
• the percentage of historical volatility in the price
of companies taken individually explained by
specific shocks to these companies was much lower
in the insurance sector than the banking sector;
• the percentage of historical volatility explained by
shocks common to the sector as a whole remained
low in both financial sectors; this confirms the
difficulty in predicting the occurrence of a systemic
risk using stock market data;
• insurance companies, contrary to the rest of the stock
market, were less affected by shocks common to banks
than banks were by shocks common to insurers;
• insurance companies and banking institutions
were more affected by shocks common to the whole
of the market than by interest rate shocks, the
former however showed greater sensitivity to
interest rate shocks than the latter.
Table 1
Breakdown of the variance in prices
(as a %)
o t e l b a t u b i r t t a e g a t n e c r e P
s k c o h s
e c n a r u s n I
s e i n a p m o c
g n i k n a B
s n o i t u t i t s n i
t e k r a m e h T
e l o h w a s a
s e i n a p m o c o t c i f i c e p S3 15 22 1
r o t c e s e c n a r u s n i e h t o t n o m m o C2 19 0 1
r o t c e s g n i k n a b e h t o t n o m m o C 254
t e k r a m e h t o t n o m m o C2 40 57 3
s k c o h s e t a r t s e r e t n i m r e t - t r o h S1 31 17 3
s e i n a p m o c e c n a r u s n i e h t f o e c n a i r a v l a c i r o t s i h e h t f o % 3 1 , e g a r e v a n o : e r u t c e L
. s e i n a p m o c e s e h t o t c i f i c e p s s k c o h s o t e l b a t u p m i s i d e i d u t s
s n o i t a l u c l a c ’ r o h t u a d n a n i w o c E : s e c r u o SBanque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 5 • November 2004 77
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Charts 1 and 2 show the results of the second type
of simulation, i.e. Monte-Carlo simulations of
random shocks over six months (Chart 1) and four
years (Chart 2), in a confidence interval of 99%. In
line with the historical simulations, these charts
show that the extreme shock scenarios associated
with the macroeconomic environment exhibit a
greater potential to destabilise the insurance sector
than the banking sector. However, contrary to the
historical simulations, they show that the extreme
shock scenarios associated with the insurance sector
are potentially less destabilising for the market than
those linked to the banking sector and that the
banking sector may be more destabilising for the




The relationships between the insurance and banking
sectors require particular attention especially since
the stock market data studied above yield an
apparently contradictory result. On the one hand,
over the period 1989-2004, insurance companies were
less affected by shocks common to the banking sector
than vice versa and, on the other hand, the banking
sector seems to exhibit a greater destabilisation
potential for the insurance sector than vice versa.
This apparent contradiction must be clarified.
A study by De Nederlandsche Bank allows us to do
so (see Minderhoud, 2003). The conclusions of this
study are based on a series of Monte-Carlo
simulations using stock market data on the largest
US, UK and German banks and life insurance firms.
The banks chosen are barely or not at all active in
the insurance sector. The study shows that the
probability of significant contagion from the
insurance sector to the banking sector increases
sharply in extreme situations. In this study,
contagion in extreme situations is defined as the
fraction of the extreme co-movements of bank stock
returns attributable to the extreme co-movements
of insurance stock returns, i.e. those which
correspond to the 5% of the largest co-movements.
In particular, it shows that the probability of an
extreme movement of bank stock returns increases
with the number of extreme movements of
insurance stock returns. For example, in the United
States, the probability of an absence of extreme
movement of bank stock prices was 90% when no
extreme movements of insurance stock prices were
observed. However, when four or more extreme
movements of insurance stocks were observed, this
probability plummeted to 10%. Given that
macroeconomic variables do not have such marked
effects during the corresponding periods, this
suggests that there is contagion from the insurance
sector to the banking sector.
This result must however be interpreted with
caution in that it uses a strictly statistical definition
of causality while it is difficult to determine the
channels through which contagion is transmitted,
above all to banking groups that do not own
insurance companies. At this stage, there
nevertheless remains the possibility that contagion
effects exist, which calls for vigilance on the part of
the financial authorities regarding the situation in
the insurance sector.
2| NEW POTENTIAL SOURCES
OF FINANCIAL INSTABILITY
Concerns that have recently emerged focus less on
insurance itself, which does not, as we have seen, pose
risks of structural instability, than on the links between
the insurance sector and the banking and reinsurance
sectors. In this regard, attention has particularly
centred on financial conglomerates and credit
derivatives. These concerns are examined below.
2|1 Financial conglomerates
Financial conglomerates offer a number of activities
within the same group, typically banking, insurance
and investment services. Most banking and insurance
groups have developed their own financial services
arms to manage the large revenues they generate.
But, this is not a major concern for financial stability,
especially in the case of insurance groups. However,
the same cannot be said of the increasing links
between the banking and insurance sectors that have
characterised the past 20 years. The bancassurance
sector has grown rapidly in France, where banking
groups have acquired insurance subsidiaries. More78 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 5 • November 2004
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Chart 1
Effects, over 6 months, of series of stochastic shocks specific to each of the variables studied on respective
values of these variables
... to the shock from EuroStoxx
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... to the shock from insurance sector
... to the shock from interest rate
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Responses from banking sector ...
... to the shock from EuroStoxx
... to the shock from banking sector
... to the shock from insurance sector
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Interpretation: the central curve shows the average of the scenarios while the extreme curves bound the interval in which 99% of the scenarios are situated.
The level of the curves and their spread at the end of the period give an idea of the potential for short-term destabilisation associated with the shocks in question.
Interest rate shocks are more destabilising for the insurance sector (level: 0.009 - spread: 0.009) than for the banking sector (level: 0.007 - spread: 0.007).
Sources: Ecowin and author’s calculations80 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 5 • November 2004
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Chart 2
Effects, over 4 years, of series of stochastic shocks specific to each of the variables studied on respective values
of these variables
... to the shock from EuroStoxx
... to the shock from banking sector
... to the shock from insurance sector
... to the shock from interest rate
... to the shock from EuroStoxx
... to the shock from banking sector
... to the shock from insurance sector
... to the shock from interest rate
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Interpretation: the central curve shows the average of the scenarios while the extreme curves bound the interval in which 99% of the scenarios are situated.
The level of the curves and their spread at the end of the period give an idea of the potential for destabilisation associated with the shocks in question.
Interest rate shocks are more destabilising for the insurance sector (level: 0.09 - spread: 0.18) than for the banking sector (level: 0.06 - spread: 0.12).
Sources Ecowin and author’s calculations
Responses from banking sector ...
... to the shock from EuroStoxx
... to the shock from banking sector 
... to the shock from insurance sector
Responses from insurance sector ...
... to the shock from interest rate
... to the shock from EuroStoxx
... to the shock from banking sector
... to the shock from insurance sector
... to the shock from interest rate
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recently, however, Germany saw the opposite
development, with the insurance group Allianz
acquiring a major bank subsidiary. These closer links
between the insurance and banking sectors have
raised concerns among a number of decision-makers
as to problems stemming from the insurance sector
that could, in view of these links, spread to the
banking sector and thus jeopardise financial stability,
or even take on a systemic dimension. Furthermore,
the fact that, to date, such a risk has not materialised
does not mean that we can assume that it does not
exist given that this rapprochement between the
sectors is too recent a phenomenon for all the
consequences to be correctly assessed.
At first sight, it might be thought that financial
conglomerates, in particular bancassurance, would
tend to reduce the risks of financial instability in
that they allow banks to diversify their activities.
This diversification can foster economies of scale
and above all new technical and commercial
opportunities, which can only be beneficial for
financial stability. In particular, it gives rise to
(see Boot, 2003):
• a more efficient use of information technologies
(compilation of more comprehensive and coherent
databases, etc.),
•  a rationalisation of distribution networks
(development of multichannel strategies combining
bank and agent networks, capitalising on reputation
effects, etc.),
• a greater potential for financial innovations
(reduction of fixed costs of innovation, transfer of
financial technologies between the different
branches of the group, etc.),
• a cultivation of complementarities (a broader range
of savings products, development of an internal
capital market, a greater asset management
potential, etc.),
• a reduction of the group’s overall risk (a lower
degree of correlation between risks when
diversifying into very different areas).
However, despite this potential for reducing costs,
conglomerates do not always seem to be able to
achieve these gains. Firstly, conglomerates generate
specific costs that should not be overlooked (see
Boot, 2003). In particular, they give rise to costs
relating to different corporate cultures as well as
inefficiency costs arising from poorly-exploited
cross-subsidy opportunities in favour of
non-profitable activities. Moreover, the potential for
reducing costs discussed above may be hampered
by the long-term fixed costs that are synonymous
with information technologies, the management of
networks and the transfer of technology. Lastly,
when groups increase their size and diversify their
activities, they do not necessarily reduce their risks:
• risk reduction is minimal at the conglomerate level
compared to the disaggregated level given that only
three risks can be diversified4 (insurance, banking
and investment services), two of which are relatively
highly correlated and the other, corresponding to
the core activity, accounts for the majority of the
group’s risk (often over 80% of the total); typically
only a reduction of around 5%-10% can be achieved
at most (see Kuritzes et alii, 2003), and close to 10%
would be reached in the case of a merger between a
bank and an insurance firm given that credit risk
has a low degree of correlation with insurance risk;
•  the increased complexity of managing
conglomerates, associated with the difficulties in
implementing efficient management and control
procedures, constitutes in itself an additional source
of risk (see Winton, 1999); the consequences may
be exacerbated by contagion associated with
reputational risks (see Cumming and Hirtle, 2001)
and by the fact that conglomerates are not only
supposed to be “too big to fail” but also “too complex
to fail” (see Herring, 2002).
All in all, conglomerates reduce risks more often
than they amplify them. This is due less to the
economies of scale, which appear limited, than to
the new technical and commercial opportunities
that such structures procure as well as to the lower
degree of correlation of the risks between the
insurance and the banking sectors, for both life and
non-life sectors.5 However, as we saw in Part One,
the low degree of average correlation between bank
risks and insurance risks does not rule out a
“recorrelation” of these risks at the expense of the
banking sector in extreme situations.
4 Note that this result stems from the fact that the value of standard deviation σ/√N decreases with the number N of independent risks included in
the portfolio of activity X.
5 See Boot (A. W. A.) (2003), Kuritzes (A.) et alii (2003), Beitel (P.) and Schiereck (D.) (2001).Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 5 • November 2004 83
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The insurance component of financial conglomerates
does not in itself pose risks of structural instability
for conglomerates. The supplementary supervision
of conglomerates, provided for in the 2003 EU Council
Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council, thus appears to be sufficient at present, on
the condition that it is implemented in a coordinated
and consistent fashion in order to control any risks
emanating from the insurance sector.
2|2 Credit derivatives
In 2001, the Bank of England, in an article in its
Financial Stability Review, drew attention to the
transfer of credit risk from banks to insurance
companies, under conditions that are not necessarily
well controlled (see Rule, 2001). Naturally, the article
did not focus on insurance companies’ traditional
investment activity, which exposes them to
significant credit risk. In France, 50% of insurance
companies’ assets are invested in corporate
securities: 23% in equities (of which 1.5% in
non-listed shares of companies outside the insurance
sector) and 27% in corporate bonds. French
insurance companies therefore account for a
significant share of the markets in question: 40% of
corporate bond holdings, 6% of listed share holdings
and 3% of unlisted share holdings. Figures are
broadly similar for the euro area. The article did
not focus either on protection purchased by
insurance companies against credit risk. These
purchases enable such companies to protect their
assets. Instead, the article centred on the protection
sold by insurance firms.
At the global level, insurers are significant net
protection sellers: they account for 33% of protection
sold compared with just 8% of the demand for
protection in 2002.6 Half of the protection sold was
offered by US “monoliners” specialised in municipal
bonds, while reinsurers only account for 12% of the
protection sold in the sector (see Fitch Ratings, 2003).
Most of the transactions (92%) took the form of cash
or synthetic CDOs (collateralized debt obligations)
and were mainly carried out in the United States
(76%) (see Fitch Ratings, 2003).
The participation of insurers and reinsurers in this
market as protection sellers simply draws on the skills
they have acquired as investors both in terms of analysing
corporate bond spreads and equities. Their expertise lies
both in assessing credit risk and valuing credit
derivatives, thanks, in the case of the latter, to their
proficiency in the area of yield spreads. Moreover, by
acquiring credit risk, insurers diversify their risks, in
the knowledge that credit risk has a low degree of
correlation with insurance risk. Most of them also
enhance their sound financial positions and good ratings.
However, the transfer of credit risk from banks to
insurance companies has certain characteristics that
may suggest that high or poorly-controlled risks exist:
• risk transfer is concentrated among few players, i.e.
between fifteen to twenty in the world (in France, a
single player accounts for most of the market’s capacity);
• insurers and reinsurers are linked by the spiral of
retrocessions typical of such transactions, as well
as by collateral mechanisms, under conditions that
resemble those of interbank lending;
• the ISDA master agreement, which effectively
governs the OTC derivatives market, contains a
close-out netting provision that authorises the
non-defaulting party to unwind its positions with
the parties associated with the defaulting party; this
provision may be dangerous for the rest of the
market if its application results in large-scale sales
of illiquid collateral in periods when prices are
falling sharply (see Herring, 2002);
• the main players, which account for two-thirds of
market supply, either hardly diversify their risks
(monoliners), or are little or not at all regulated (in
particular reinsurers in Bermuda), which may
encourage regulatory arbitrage; more fundamentally,
the off-balance-sheet nature of these transactions has
largely contributed to their opacity and to the fears
they have sparked.
Nevertheless, the practical consequences of these
risks should not be overstated:
• when insurers and reinsurers buy credit risk they
are extremely selective: at the global level, in 2002,
57% of credit risk purchase was rated AAA (compared
with 22% for the market as a whole) and only 4%
was below investment grade (compared with 8% for
the market as a whole) (see Fitch Ratings, 2003);
6 See British Banker’s Association (2002).84 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 5 • November 2004
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7 For France, see: Commission bancaire, Commission de contrôle des assurances and Autorité des marchés financiers (2004).
in France, 78% of the risk purchased was AAA or AA
while 10% was rated investment grade or below;7
• the exposure of insurers and reinsurers to credit
risk only accounted for 0.06% of annual premiums
worldwide in the sector in 20027; it should also be
noted that in 2003 major insurers and reinsurers
reduced their positions;
• more fundamentally, credit risk transfer spreads
this risk and, in doing so, reduces the risks of
financial instability even if we assume that
protection sellers are not as sound as we may wish.
It nonetheless constitutes an additional barrier to
the propagation of shocks associated with credit risk;
• regulatory arbitrage remains, to date, a fairly
limited phenomenon;7 on the one hand, in Europe,
the sale of credit protection by insurers is only just
tolerated (in France, it only accounts for 13% of
banks’ net buying position),7 and, on the other hand,
reinsurers are regulated in the United States and
are set to be in Europe.
Basically, we cannot ignore the fact that credit risk,
before being transferred from banks to insurance
companies, is generated by banks through their
lending to companies. This risk then circulates in
the economy via transfer mechanisms, without it
being either amplified or reduced. Consequently, the
problems raised from the transfer of credit risk from
banks to insurance companies stem from elsewhere:
• firstly, they result from the illusion of immunity
that transfers can give to banks, which might then
underestimate the counterparty risk they take on;
• for a long time, emphasis has been placed on
accounting presentation rather than the quality of
the transfers. Assessing their quality is however
essential for measuring the soundness of banks.
Work must focus on the above areas. To achieve
progress in these areas, more information must be
gathered than is currently at our disposal in order to
gain a more comprehensive and clearer understanding
of risk. The supervisory authorities have started to do
so at the microeconomic level and must now extend
their work to the macroeconomic level. More
comprehensive and more frequent information on
banks’ positions could be obtained either by
introducing further reporting requirements, which are
limited in that they do not necessarily encourage
agents to report all the relevant information but just
that which is required, or by using surveys, which are
more costly in terms of processing.
2|3 Reinsurance
Reinsurance can be defined as the acceptance by an
insurer of some or all of the risk underwritten by
another insurer. The insurer is solely responsible for
the financial obligations under the policies it issues;
the reinsurer only takes on some or all of the cost of
the risk when it materialises. Pursuant to the provisions
of the reinsurance treaty, the sharing of risk with the
reinsurer may be proportional (in 80% of treaties in
the case of automatic reinsurance) or non-proportional
(in 16% of treaties, the remaining 4% being accounted
for by facultative reinsurance). Non-proportional
reinsurance is also known as excess of loss or stop-loss
reinsurance. In the case of excess of loss reinsurance,
the reinsurer grants cover for those claims that exceed
a certain fixed amount but are still below a defined
upper limit. In the case of stop loss reinsurance, which
is rarer these days, the reinsurer covers the share of
the insurer’s annual losses over and above an upper
limit and, possibly, below a certain fixed amount.
Reinsurance has often been considered a potential
source of systemic risk within the insurance sector
for the following reasons:
•  reinsurers rarely retain all the risk they
underwrite: in general, they retrocede part of the
risk to one or more reinsurers, thus fuelling a “spiral
of retrocessions”; this constitutes a potential source
of contagion in that, in the same way as interbank
lending, it ties together all the players in the sector,
and if one reinsurer fails it is likely to affect the
whole sector;
• the complexity and, in the case of non-proportional
treaties, the non-linearity of risk sharing with the
insurer and the fairly systematic intervention of
courts in major claims, makes it difficult to assess
the actual exposure of reinsurers. Often, it is only
possible to determine the liability of the different
parties several years after the event has occurred;
• reinsurers underwrite the most volatile parts of
the risk, i.e. those corresponding to peak exposures.
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pressure or are getting into difficulties. This is
discussed in a study by the ratings agency Moody’s,
which shows that troubled insurance companies
have on average two-and-a-half times as much
exposure to reinsurance as their peers;8
• the reinsurance market is highly concentrated,
with the top five reinsurers accounting for 57% of
the world market share and the ten largest reinsurers
representing 77%; by means of comparison, the
same ratios on the French market for insurance
groups are 42% and 62% respectively;
• as we have seen, reinsurance is at the heart of
debate on credit risk transfer. Moreover, reinsurance
is the keystone of many insurance groups, even
though, in these cases, they often limit their activity
to intragroup reinsurance;
• lastly, reinsurers have taken on a key role in certain
types of coverage, associated directly or indirectly
with professional civil liability. As recent events
have shown, such as the attack on the World Trade
Center, a sudden withdrawal of reinsurers is likely
to seriously disrupt economic activity.
However, the fears of systemic risk arising from
reinsurance are probably unfounded:
• no examples of a systemic crisis originating from
the failure of a reinsurer have been observed. The
Piper Alpha Platform disaster, which sent
shockwaves through the insurance markets, raising
fears as to a collapse of the market, was finally
absorbed. Likewise, the reinsurance industry has
managed to overcome, without major defaults, the
huge and complex claims due to asbestos, the World
Trade Center attack, the world recession and the
slump in the financial markets;
• the sums involved are not so great as to seriously
jeopardise financial stability. In effect, reinsurance
only accounts for a small share of direct insurance
premiums: 4% on average, 8% of non-life premiums
and 1% of life premiums (8% if we strip out
savings-related premiums). Losses arising from
reinsurer bankruptcies only average 0.24% of freely
ceded premiums (see SwissRe, 2003);
• insurers  are  increasingly  diversifying  their
reinsurance cover; Swiss Re treaties in Europe reveal
that only 10% of ceded premiums come from
companies that entrust more than 50% of their
reinsurance cessions to Swiss Re and that 50% of
premiums come from companies that entrust less than
20% of their cessions to Swiss Re. It should be noted
that only 5% of reinsurer bankruptcies triggered major
problems for primary insurers (see SwissRe, 2003);
• the fact that reinsurers take on peak risks is offset
by the geographical diversification in terms of risks
and investments;
• risks relating to the retrocession spirals should not
be overstated; losses stemming from such spirals
only amount to USD 1 billion worldwide, or just 5%
of total retrocessions, 1% of reinsurance premiums
and 0.04% of direct insurance premiums;9
• lastly, most of the temporary and permanent
withdrawals of reinsurers, which significantly
affected activity, had such effects only because the
State imposed insurance obligations without taking
into account the solvency of the insured parties
concerned (doctors, airline companies, etc.).
In view of reinsurance’s particular characteristics,
the risks it poses to financial stability deserve special
attention. In this respect, the draft directive aiming
to subject European reinsurers to prudential
supervision and in particular to impose a solvency
margin equivalent to that of the underlying




IN THE INSURANCE SECTOR
The regulation of the insurance sector aims to
protect the interests of consumers and investors and
thus ensure financial stability. However, there are
cases where some regulations may contribute, at
times, to destabilising a sector such as the insurance
sector, with consequences that could reach beyond
the sector. Such problems exist both in the prudential
regulation of the insurance sector and in accounting
and product regulations.
8 See Moody’s Investors Service, Special Comment (2003).
9 See SwissRe (2003). This calculation is made assuming an original loss expectation of 80% of the premiums and that all retrocessions are
indefinitely transferred at a constant retrocession rate of 21% and that the average commission rate is 20% at each stage.86 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 5 • November 2004
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3|1 The prudential regulation
of insurance companies
Recent experience has shown that a number of
prudential arrangements, which are both legitimate
in principle and effective in everyday situations,
may prove inappropriate in extreme situations, as
they could encourage insurers to withdraw
inopportunely from the risks in question.
For example, the provision known as the liability risk
provision, which required insurers to make provisions
for losses on their equity and property portfolios,
suddenly amplified the shock in July 2002 when
market participants’ pessimistic expectations about
equity markets proved correct. Insurance companies
realised that as long as the market continued to
slump, they could no longer carry on financing the
liability risk provision without raising capital at the
worst time, i.e. at a time when the supply of capital
had dried up. They could only raise capital at a huge
cost or at times not at all. Therefore, these companies
had no other choice but to sell their shares at a loss
so as to limit their losses to the level they had already
reached. Consequently, they sold these assets despite
the fact that the long-term nature of their liabilities
meant that they should have been buying during a
downturn that they judged to be temporary.
This is an example of a regulation that, beyond a certain
limit, i.e. when companies started to fear raising capital,
becomes a shock amplifier. In this instance, the
shockwave was violent. At the end of 2002, government
authorities reacted and amended the detrimental
regulation, thus allowing the equally sharp decline in
equity markets of Q1 2003 to be absorbed with greater
flexibility. More generally, a number of prudential
regulations concerning the insurance sector are likely
to change in nature above and beyond a certain limit
and suddenly become destabilising not only for the
sector but also for the market as a whole.
It is important to contain the potentially destabilising
effects of these mechanisms, which are often linked to
the excessive procyclicality that such mechanisms may
exhibit under certain circumstances. As these
mechanisms cannot all be corrected, given that
prudential rules are not always compatible with a
variable geometry approach, it would be appropriate
in the future to provide for an ad hoc system for dealing
with such problems as they arise. Given that it is the
consequences of these mechanisms for the economy
as a whole and not the consequences for the insurance
companies themselves that must be kept under control,
such a system would probably best be managed by a
national authority, or even by a European body in
charge of overall economic policy, above and beyond
all other specific measures that may be taken, according
to the circumstances, by regulators and supervisors.
3|2 Accounting regulations
Accounting standards aim to protect the interests of
investors and the market, which may be destabilised
by a lack of transparent financial information.
International and cross-sector comparability of
accounts is vital for this transparency. Hence the
new international accounting standards based on
the fair value principle which are set to replace
current local accounting standards based on the
historical cost principle. However, the new
accounting standards, which will temporarily apply
as of 1 January 2005 to insurers’ consolidated
accounts, could foster financial instability in the
insurance sector for the following reasons.
• These transitional provisions are inconsistent in that
they do not apply the same accounting philosophy to
liabilities and assets: liabilities will continued to be
valued at historical cost, whereas assets will be valued
at fair value. They constitute an autonomous source
of volatility that could be even more disruptive given
that we will be in an extreme situation, as Chart 3
below shows. This Chart gives the results of the
simulation of a sharp rise in interest rates during the
transition phase, known as Phase 1, for both the
current historical cost accounting framework and the
future accounting framework where liabilities will also
be at valued fair value. It clearly shows the atypical
reaction of the accounts during this transition period.
• The new accounting standards do not recognise
the economic and financial realities of the insurance
industry. They do not allow for the possibility of
booking assets in the same way as liabilities when
they are used for covering these liabilities, as is the
case in insurance. They ignore the concept of asset
and liability portfolios, even though the wholeBanque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 5 • November 2004 87
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insurance industry relies on the pooling of risks
within sufficiently diversified portfolios. Lastly, they
ignore peak risks and their intertemporal pooling,
which are central to disaster insurance.
• IAS standards introduce, for the transition phase
alone, a multiplicity of options that leave much
discretion to the compilers of accounts. Consequently,
compared to the present situation, not only the
comparability of insurance companies’ accounts will
not be improved at the intersectoral and international
levels (if there is no transatlantic convergence), but
it will even worsen at the national sectoral level.
Even if we do not assume that there is a certain
accounting illusion, it is difficult to imagine that
these problems will not be without impact on the
stability of the insurance sector. In the coming years,
these problems may prove to be a recurrent source
of financial instability for European markets.
3|3 The regulation of products
The aim of regulating products is to protect insured
parties. This regulation should not have consequences,
especially detrimental ones, for economic activity.
However, this may be the case when it imposes
constraints that are unrealistic in view of market
conditions. A textbook case would be where it was
made compulsory to cover an uninsurable risk (i.e. a
risk that has no known probable maximum cost): no
insurer concerned about its long-term solvency and
its credibility among policy holders would take on such
a risk. Less directly, by subjecting one or more activities
to such unrealistic constraints, regulation may result
in the collapse of the market and of the activities in
question, or even disrupt economic activity.
In particular, this is the case when government
authorities make insurance compulsory for insured
parties who are not willing to pay the actual cost, as
illustrated by the current difficulties in obtaining
coverage experienced by members of the medical
profession in France. A judge, by his/her decision, may
cause the collapse of entire segments of the insurance
market, with possible deleterious consequences for
the economy. This would be the case for example if
he/she fundamentally changed, ex post facto, the
obligations of existing contracts, as illustrated by
insurers’ reservations over covering asbestos risk (in
the light of class actions brought in US courts) or
gynaecological risks (following the Perruche decision
in France).
The insurance market, which is complex by nature,
struggles to adapt to too much intervention. Indeed,
the risk insurers bear is volatile and difficult to
comprehend and must be treated with great caution:
this is a prerequisite for upholding the confidence
on which professionals count in order to be able to
continue offering coverage without difficulties. Most
of the temporary or long-term problems that have
arisen in the past few years can be attributed to
such interventions and not to financial difficulties
or even the bankruptcy of certain insurance firms.
Chart 3
Net equity of the French life insurance market in 2002
in the event of a 400 bp rise in interest rates
(in EUR billion)
Interpretation: following the simulated rise in interest rates, French life
insurance companies’ net assets are likely to stand at
EUR 40 billion  under  French  accounting  standards,
EUR –70 billion under IAS Phase 1 and EUR 5 billion or
EUR 15 billion under IAS Phase 2, depending on whether the
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All in all, although we cannot deny that the difficulties of some insurance companies may result in major
economic or financial disruptions, the fact remains that insurance and reinsurance do not appear to constitute,
in themselves, an actual source of systemic risk or even of serious financial instability. In fact, everything
indicates that they act as shock absorbers. They only appear to become a source of instability in very
specific conditions, independent of insurance itself. We should therefore not underestimate the risks
associated with certain changes observed in this sector. At present, the response of European regulators
is probably appropriate for the nature of these risks. However, in addition, it would be advisable to:
• accelerate European reforms of insurance solvency regulation,
• scrutinise the coordination and the consistency of the supervision of financial conglomerates,
• collect more comprehensive data on credit risk transfers,
• mitigate the risks of instability related to the existing prudential framework,
• provide for an insurance crisis management procedure at the macroeconomic level,
• encourage the IAS Board to improve the quality of the standards applicable to insurance,
• consolidate the legal environment for insurance as much as possible.Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 5 • November 2004 89
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